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LAND POLICIES AND THEIR OUTCOMES

Edited by Gregory K. Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong

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Hopeful Signs: U.S. Urban Revitalization in the Twenty-First Century

Eugénie L. Birch

Since 1970, massive urban revitalization has been taking place in U.S. cities, especially in the 25 most populous (Simmons and Lang 2001; Fanton 2004; Glaeser and Gottlieb 2006). Although large cities have tended to lead this effort, smaller ones have followed suit. Broadly construed, this revitalization has many forms related to the age, local political strength, and economic vigor of the cities in which it is taking place. In general, these forms fall into four interrelated categories: (1) catalytic; (2) downtown; (3) neighborhood; and (4) project-focused. The categories are not exclusive, because cities have and are pursuing more than one approach at the same or different times.

Urban revitalization is a slow process. In the United States, what appear to be hopeful signs today are the outgrowths of 30 years of experience in addressing structural—economic, demographic, and political—changes played out in cities. In addition, tactics undertaken more recently have yet to yield their full results. Finally, some places are more advanced than others. Cities of all sizes have engaged in some form of renewal since 1970. Those involved in certain types of urban revitalization for more than three decades can measure their success in the growth, maintenance, or slower rates of loss of their populations; the increase in or stabilization of their land values; and new patterns of development or altered market dynamics. This chapter will outline the types of urban revitalization strategies in play, but an in-depth evaluation of their success is beyond its scope.

In exploring urban revitalization, this chapter focuses on cities, not metropolitan regions. By emphasizing cities, it underlines the primary purpose of urban revitalization: to enhance a city's chief asset, its land. U.S. cities support their municipal services and public amenities with taxes raised locally and collected directly (property) or indirectly (income/wage and sales) from the productive use of their land. Cities that have more land or more highly desired land not only are more able to meet their municipal obligations than others, but also have greater choices in their urban revitalization strategies.

This survey of the hopeful signs of urban revitalization has four parts. The first part reviews city population changes from 1970 to the present, highlighting the U.S. national urban profile, regional shifts, and specific city performances to outline the demographic context of contemporary urban revitalization.[1] The second part considers the twin, interrelated phenomena that are shaping late twentieth-century cities and driving urban revitalization approaches: (1) the evolving theoretical and attitudinal underpinnings of city development, and (2) the shifting economic, demographic, and legislative climate. The third part surveys the urban revitalization categories listed earlier, defining each one. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief assessment of future urban revitalization.

The Context of U.S. Urban Revitalization: 1970–2004

National and regional urban growth patterns provide a context for understanding urban revitalization in the United States. As measured by the decennial census, the country has become increasingly urban in the past three decades, especially as related to the number of cities, their population sizes, and land areas or carrying capacities. In addition, the U.S. has seen dramatic changes in the regional distribution of its urban population.

THE NATIONAL URBAN PROFILE

That the United States was definitively an urban nation was revealed in 1970 when the U.S. Census Bureau reported that 74 percent of Americans were living in urban places, a figure that increased to 79 percent in the ensuing decades.[2] Between 1970 and 2004, the nation's urban population grew 22 percent, and beginning in 1970 more urbanites lived in the suburbs than in central cities.

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1. In this section, 1970 serves as the base year because in that year cities lost their population dominance and in that decade urban public policy developed in new directions.

2. Between 1970 and 1990, the U.S. Census Bureau defined *urban* as consisting of "territory, persons, and housing units in: 1. Places of 2,500 or more persons incorporated as cities, villages, boroughs (except in Alaska and New York), and towns (except in the six New England States, New York, and Wisconsin), but excluding the rural portions of 'extended cities.' 2. Census designated places of 2,500 or more persons. 3. Other territory, incorporated or unincorporated, included in urbanized areas" (http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/urdef.txt). In 2000 the Census Bureau adjusted the definition to include other areas: For recent censuses, the U.S. Census Bureau defined *urban* as including "all population and territory in *urbanized areas*, which are densely settled areas containing at least 50,000 people, and in other places with a population of 2,500 or more (but excluding the portion of a few incorporated places that contained a significant amount of sparsely settled territory)." To provide better data for the nation's urban and rural populations, the Census Bureau decided it was necessary to establish a geographic entity that better supplemented the urbanized areas. Thus, for Census 2000, it established *urban clusters*, which are densely settled areas with a population of 2,500 to 49,999. The Census Bureau also made some refinements to the criteria for delineating urbanized areas for Census 2000 (http://www.census.gov/geo/www/tiger/glossary.html#urbanandrural).

In 2004, 130 million (or 44 percent) Americans lived in the nation's 1,302 cities of 25,000+, up 43 percent from 90 million in 1970. Also in 2004, as in 1970, 27 percent of Americans were residents of large cities with populations of 100,000 or more, and of these about a third lived in the 100 most populous places and 12 percent lived in the top 25. (The latter category contains cities that often have had active and innovative urban revitalization programs.) Although the percentage of city dwellers has remained stable, individual city performance varies. With the exception of cities with populations of 500,000–999,999, all city categories have experienced population growth rates of 25 percent or higher, with the 100,000–249,999 group seeing a 92 percent increase (see table 12.1).

Three important trends contribute to this growth. First, cities of 25,000 and over have grown in number; they are up 61 percent (see figure 12.1 for their distribution over time). Second, more cities have larger populations. In 1970 only 156 cities had populations of 100,000 or more; by 2004 that number had risen to 251, and the cutoff number for the hundredth city had increased 43 percent, from 139,000 in 1970 to 199,000 in 2004 (see table 12.1). Third, rapidly growing cities have greatly expanded their capacity to absorb more people or to raise more revenues by extending their boundaries or by amending or building out their zoning. (Emblematic are San Antonio, whose area grew 122 percent while its population rose only 75 percent, and San Francisco, whose area remained the same but its 1970s residential space grew 70 percent.) In 2004 the size distribution percentages were unchanged since 2000.

REGIONAL CITY PROFILES

Since 1970, the increases in land area and related population/household growth have had dramatic effects on the regional distribution of large city populations. Among the most populous 25 cities in 2000, the Northeast dominated, with 34 percent of the total (down from 41 percent in 1970). The West with 27 percent of the total population (up from 21 percent in 1970) was second; the South with 22 percent (up from 16 percent) was third; and the Midwest slipped to fourth place (it had 18 percent of the total, down from 23 percent in 1970).[3] These changes do not parallel the national population rankings, in which between 1970 and 2000 the South and the Midwest maintained their first and second rankings, while the West replaced the Northeast in 2000 at third.

For the most populous 25 cities, household data reveal a slightly different profile. Because households drive housing demand, which, in turn, is related to land consumption and development patterns, this difference is important. Overall, households (increased by 19 percent) grew at 2.4 times the rate of population (8 percent). This ratio is higher than that for the nation as a whole (1.9 percent).[4] Regional

3. In terms of the number of cities among the most populous 25, the regional distribution in 2000 was: 1. South (36 percent of the total); 2. West (28 percent); 3. Midwest (20 percent); and 4. Northeast (16 percent). This differs from the population share of the most populous 25 cities as explained, showing that, for example, the southern cities while constituting more than one-third of the total housed only about one-fifth of the population in these places. Conversely, the Northeast had only 16 percent of the cities but housed more than one-third of the population.

4. Between 1970 and 2000, the national population grew 35 percent and households 67 percent. High rates of suburban growth fueled these figures during this period.

Table 12.1
Overview of U.S. Urban Population, 1970–2004

Category	Population (in thousands)					Percentage Change				
	1970	1980	1990	2000	2004	1970–1980	1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–2004	1970–2004
1 million+	18,742	17,000	20,000	22,900	23,400	–9	18	15	2	25
500,000–999,999	12,967	10,900	10,100	12,900	14,700	–16	–7	28	14	13
250,000–499,999	10,442	11,800	14,200	13,300	13,400	13	20	–6	1	28
100,000–249,999	14,285	16,600	19,100	25,500	27,400	16	15	34	7	92
50,000–99,999	16,724	17,600	21,200	24,900	28,100	5	20	17	13	68
25,000–49,999	17,820	18,400	20,000	22,600	23,100	3	9	13	2	30
Urban population in cities 25,000+	90,980	92,302	104,602	122,102	130,102	1	13	17	7	43
(% of total urban population)	(61)	(66)	(68)	(70)	(71)					
% of U.S. population living in cities of 25,000+	45	41	42	43	44					
% of U.S. population living in cities of 100,000+	28	25	25	27	27					
% of U.S. population living in 25 most populous cities	15	13	12	12	12					
Population of 100th most populous city	139	157	171	195	199	13	9	14	2	43
City	Evansville, IN	Providence, RI	Arlington, VA	Glendale, CA	Shreveport, LA					

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2005).

Figure 12.1
Distribution of U.S. Cities by Population Size, 1970–2004



differences appear in these data. For example, household decline in the Northeast (–2 percent) and the Midwest (–18 percent) was much lower than their population loss (Northeast, –10 percent; Midwest, 28 percent), while the South's household growth rate (95 percent) greatly surpassed its population increase (66 percent). The West showed only a 1 percent difference between the two (table 12.2).

Translated into land consumption, the top 25 cities of 2000 cover 22 percent more land than those of 1970. Accounting for the change is the increase in the geographically larger southern and western cities that have replaced the smaller northern and Midwestern cities. However, the presence of a large stock of housing and wide infrastructural underpinnings in the Northeast and the Midwest not only has put a brake on population losses in declining cities in those regions—"as long as a city has homes, people will live in them" (Glaeser and Shapiro 2001, 8)—but also has accommodated new households within existing neighborhoods in the regions' growing cities. Conversely, the absence of dwellings, combined with changing residential preferences fostering demand for larger units, has fueled greenfield development in the sprawling southern cities.[5]

5. Between 1970 and 2000, the average size of new single-family housing units grew about 50 percent, from 1,375 square feet to 2,057 square feet.

Table 12.2
The 25 Most Populous Cities by Decade, 1970–2005

1970 Place	Population	Households	Area
New York City	7,894,862	2,836,872	300
Chicago	3,366,957	1,137,854	223
Los Angeles	2,816,061	1,027,374	464
Philadelphia	1,948,609	642,145	129
Detroit	1,511,482	497,753	138
Houston	1,232,802	393,555	433
Baltimore	905,759	289,349	78
Dallas	844,401	280,993	265
Washington	756,510	262,538	61
Cleveland	750,903	248,280	76
Indianapolis	744,624	235,772	379
Milwaukee	717,099	236,981	95
San Francisco	715,674	295,174	46
San Diego	696,769	227,006	317
San Antonio	654,153	190,692	184
Boston	641,071	217,622	46
Memphis	623,530	190,006	217
St. Louis	622,236	215,479	61
New Orleans	593,471	191,363	197
Phoenix	581,562	186,082	248
Columbus	539,677	173,056	135
Seattle	530,831	206,092	84
Jacksonville	528,865	161,781	766
Pittsburgh	520,117	178,016	55
Denver	514,678	185,331	95
Total	31,252,703	10,707,166	5,092

Top 25 cities	31,252,703
% of U.S. population	15
U.S. population	203,235,298
U.S. households	63,450,000

Added from 1960:	Dropped from 1960:
Columbus	Atlanta
Indianapolis	Buffalo
Jacksonville	Cincinnati
Phoenix	Minneapolis

Table 12.2
(*continued*)

1980 Place	Population	Households	Area
New York City	7,071,639	2,788,530	302
Chicago	3,005,072	1,093,407	228
Los Angeles	2,966,850	1,135,230	465
Philadelphia	1,688,210	619,791	135
Houston	1,595,138	602,696	556
Detroit	1,203,339	433,488	137
Dallas	904,078	355,072	333
San Diego	875,538	321,060	320
Phoenix	789,704	284,780	324
Baltimore	786,775	281,414	80
San Antonio	785,880	258,984	263
Indianapolis	700,807	260,167	352
San Francisco	678,974	298,956	46
Memphis	646,974	230,474	264
Washington	638,333	253,143	63
Milwaukee	636,212	241,817	96
San Jose	629,442	209,593	158
Cleveland	573,822	218,298	79
Columbus	564,871	169,674	181
Boston	562,994	218,457	47
New Orleans	557,515	206,435	199
Jacksonville	540,920	193,370	760
Seattle	493,846	219,469	84
Denver	492,365	211,566	111
Nashville	455,651	169,674	480
Total	29,844,949	11,275,545	6,063

Top 25 cities	29,844,949
% of U.S. population	13
U.S. population	226,504,825
U.S. households	80,776,000

Added from 1970:	Dropped from 1970:
Nashville	Pittsburgh
San Jose	St. Louis

Table 12.2
(*continued*)

1990 Place	Population	Households	Area
New York City	7,322,564	2,819,401	309
Los Angeles	3,485,398	1,217,405	469
Chicago	2,783,726	1,025,174	227
Houston	1,630,553	616,877	540
Philadelphia	1,585,577	603,075	135
San Diego	1,110,549	406,096	324
Detroit	1,027,974	374,057	139
Dallas	1,006,877	402,060	342
Phoenix	983,403	369,921	420
San Antonio	935,933	326,761	333
San Jose	782,248	250,218	171
Indianapolis	741,952	291,946	362
Baltimore	736,014	276,484	81
San Francisco	723,959	305,584	47
Jacksonville	635,230	241,384	759
Columbus	632,910	256,996	191
Milwaukee	628,088	240,540	96
Memphis	610,337	229,829	256
Washington	606,900	249,634	61
Boston	574,283	228,464	48
Seattle	516,259	236,702	84
El Paso	515,342	160,545	245
Cleveland	505,616	199,787	77
New Orleans	496,938	188,235	181
Nashville	488,374	198,585	473
Total	31,067,004	11,715,760	6,370

Top 25 cities	31,067,004
% of U.S. population	12
U.S. population	248,781,302
U.S. households	93,347,000

Added from 1980:	Dropped from 1980:
El Paso	Denver

Table 12.2
(*continued*)

2000 Place	Population	Households	Area
New York City	8,008,278	3,021,588	303
Los Angeles	3,694,820	1,275,412	469
Chicago	2,896,016	1,061,928	227
Houston	1,953,631	717,945	579
Philadelphia	1,517,550	590,071	135
Phoenix	1,321,045	465,834	475
San Diego	1,223,400	450,691	324
Dallas	1,188,580	451,833	343
San Antonio	1,144,646	405,474	408
Detroit	951,270	336,428	139
San Jose	894,943	276,598	180
Indianapolis	781,870	320,107	362
San Francisco	776,733	329,700	47
Jacksonville	735,617	284,499	758
Columbus	711,470	301,534	210
Austin	656,562	265,649	132
Baltimore	651,154	257,996	81
Memphis	650,100	250,721	279
Milwaukee	596,974	232,188	96
Boston	589,141	239,528	48
Washington	572,059	248,338	61
El Paso	563,662	182,063	249
Seattle	563,374	258,499	84
Denver	554,636	239,235	153
Nashville	545,524	277,403	473
Total	33,743,055	12,741,262	6,615

Top 25 cities	33,743,055
% of U.S. population	12
U.S. population	281,424,602
U.S. households	104,705,000

Added from 1990:	Dropped from 1990:
Austin	Cleveland
Denver	New Orleans

Table 12.2
(*continued*)

2000 Place	Population % Change 1970–2000	Households % Change 1970–2000	Area % Change 1970–2000
New York City	1	7	1
Los Angeles	31	24	1
Chicago	–14	–7	2
Houston	58	82	34
Philadelphia	–22	–8	5
Phoenix	127	150	92
San Diego	76	99	2
Dallas	41	61	29
San Antonio	75	113	122
Detroit	–37	–32	1
San Jose	101	112	28
Indianapolis	6	36	–5
San Francisco	9	12	3
Jacksonville	39	76	–1
Columbus	32	74	56
Austin	161	238	249
Baltimore	–28	–11	2
Memphis	4	32	28
Milwaukee	–17	–2	1
Boston	–8	10	5
Washington	–24	–5	0
El Paso	75	106	111
Seattle	6	25	0
Denver	8	29	61
Nashville	22	98	–7
Total	8	19	30

Table 12.2
(*continued*)

2005 Place	Population	Population % Change 2000–2005
New York City	8,143,197	2
Los Angeles	3,844,829	4
Chicago	2,842,518	–2
Houston	2,016,582	3
Philadelphia	1,463,281	–4
Phoenix	1,461,575	11
San Antonio	1,256,509	10
San Diego	1,255,540	3
Dallas	1,213,825	2
San Jose	912,332	2
Detroit	886,671	–7
Indianapolis	784,118	0
Jacksonville	782,623	6
San Francisco	739,426	–5
Columbus	730,657	3
Austin	690,252	5
Memphis	672,777	3
Baltimore	635,815	–2
Fort Worth	624,067	15
Charlotte	610,949	9
El Paso	598,590	6
Milwaukee	578,887	–3
Seattle	573,911	2
Boston	559,034	–5
Denver	557,917	1
Total	34,435,882	2
Top 25 cities	68,871,764	
% of U.S. population	12	
U.S. population	299,148,983	
U.S. households	113,146,000	
Added from 2000:	Dropped from 2000:	
Charlotte	Nashville	
Fort Worth	Washington	

Source: Gibson (1998).

Another way of thinking about regional urban dynamics is embodied in the recent studies of "megaregions," large areas bound together by common economic, ecological, transportation, and cultural systems (Lang and Dhavale 2005; America 2050 2006; Florida 2006). In identifying 10 U.S. megaregions containing two-thirds of the nation's population (and predicted to absorb 70 percent of America's growth by 2050), this analysis provides a fine-grained view of the regional arrangements of city populations, because it segments the fast-growing West and South. With each megaregion containing several large cities, the Northeast, Midwest, and Southland (Southern California/Nevada) have disproportionate shares of the urban population (see figure 12.2). The Piedmont (Atlanta, Charlotte, Raleigh-Durham), the Florida (Tampa, Orlando, Miami, Jacksonville), and the Arizona Sun Corridor (Phoenix, Tucson) megaregions have the highest growth rates. Furthermore, initial work shows important clustering and interchanges among the cities in the megaregions (Lang and Dhavale 2005).

THE NATION'S MOST POPULOUS CITIES AND THEIR TRENDS

When the U.S. Census Bureau released its city population estimates in July 2005, the revisions of the 2000 numbers held only one surprise for the top 25 cities: San Antonio had replaced San Diego at seventh place. And since 1970, the populations of several southern and western cities have surpassed those of the North and Midwest. Notably, the cities that dramatically boosted their populations between 1970 and 2000 also significantly increased their land areas (see table 12.2).[6]

These trends have several implications for urban revitalization. First, a substantial proportion (43 percent) of the national population lives in cities (27 percent in large cities) and represents a group served by revitalization programs. Second, the cities in the categories 25,000 and up, 100,000 and up, and 100,000–249,999 constitute a critical mass of places developing various strategies to enhance their land uses and land values. Third, because cities exist within larger geographic areas, their revitalization approaches bear some relationship to their regional or megaregional positions. Fourth, 80 percent of the most populous cities have generally remained in the highest rankings (the top 25) in the past 30 years. Others that greatly enlarged their land areas over the past three decades replaced the 20 percent that fell off the chart, principally geographically small cities. Physical growth is one factor that shapes different urban revitalization strategies as each city strives to maintain its position. The dramatic difference in the size and scale of U.S. cities requires revitalization strategies appropriate to their locations and needs. For example, many older northeastern cities have strengthened their cores with the transformation of their downtowns, while newer southern and western cities have promoted growth at their peripheries (Berube and Forman 2002; Birch 2005).

6. Table 12.2 also includes land area increases since 1950 in recognition of the time lags between area enlargement and population growth.

Figure 12.2
Ten Megaregions Likely to Capture 70 Percent of Nation's Population Growth by 2050



Source: America 2050, http://www.america2050.org/mega-regions.html.

The Twin Phenomena Shaping Today's Cities and Driving Urban Revitalization

A number of factors, grouped under two headings, have shaped the nation's cities with regard to their physical, economic, and demographic forms as well as driven the course of contemporary urban revitalization. They form a complex constellation that serves as the foundation for any discussion of public policy related to today's evolving urban environment.

EVOLVING THEORETICAL AND ATTITUDINAL UNDERPINNINGS

Theoretical and attitudinal shifts have transformed thinking about cities, their role in the American economy and society, the nature of their "contents," and the sources of their choice of urban revitalization approaches.[7] Five themes characterize twenty-first-century urban theory: (1) place matters; (2) social and economic heterogeneity is important; (3) locals know best; (4) the private market is key; (5) and cities "rock."

Although cities have existed for centuries, the speed and scale of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century urbanization in Europe and America created a new urban form characterized by massive crowding, concentration of poverty, public health hazards, environmental pollution, and social ills affecting large swaths of city land. These conditions stimulated the contemporary urban theory underpinning today's urban revitalization. In the 1930s, analysts called slums and blighted areas significant problems, arguing that their elimination would be beneficial to the overall welfare of cities and the nation (Bauer 1934; Wood 1935; Mumford 1961). Postwar social and political conditions, including the civil rights movement and growing consciousness of the nation's economic divide, added a social agenda based on theories that either labeled the chronic problems of the poor as the "culture of poverty" (later, "underclass" behavior) or fostered empowerment among the disenfranchised poor (Lewis 1961; Piven and Cloward 1971; Sawhill 1988).

From the New Deal to the Great Society, politicians, reformers, and other interested parties developed federal programs with spatially targeted categorical funds to address slum clearance, public housing, and urban renewal, and later early childhood education, job training, and expanded public assistance (Aaron 1972; Hirsch and Mohl 1993; von Hoffman 1993). The efforts, heavily supported by liberal Democrats and their allies, quickly drew criticism (Jacobs 1961; Gans 1962; Anderson 1964; Mohl 1993, 19) and launched a bitter debate, later cast as a "people vs. place" dichotomy (Peterson 1981; Lehman 1994) that colored evolving urban policy.

In the 1970s, upon their ascendancy in the Nixon and later Reagan administrations, conservative Republicans, adhering to "New Federalist" theories, substituted revenue sharing (community development block grants), portable housing vouchers, and low-income housing tax credits for site-specific, categorical grant programs. Although they tied the funding and tax relief to local political jurisdictions—municipalities and states—they allowed their aspatial application within cities.

7. See von Hoffman, Belsky, and Lee (2006) for an exhaustive assessment of the current literature on the relationship between housing markets and community development.

Place Matters By the early 1990s, urban theorists in sociology, political science, economics, and urban design were renewing their attention to place-based considerations. Sociologists observed dysfunctional low-income neighborhoods, highlighting the out-migration of the economically able and the social isolation of the most disadvantaged members of society (Wilson 1987, 1996; Massey and Denton 1993). Political scientists, decrying these phenomena as inequitable, demanded an end to economic segregation in central cities (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2001). Economists rediscovered urban agglomeration, underlining the importance of cities to the national economy (Quigley 1998; Strange 2006); focused on the behavior of the economy's "knowledge workers," noting their increasing tendency to locate in cities (Cortright 2004; Glaeser and Gottlieb 2006); and identified the strength of inner-city markets (Porter 1995).

On the physical side, architects promoted "New Urbanism," an outgrowth of Jane Jacobs's 1961 paean to urban life (Lynch 1981; Duany, Plater-Zyberk, and Speck 2000); city planners valued funky city neighborhoods for their abilities to attract "new economy" workers (Florida 2002); historic preservationists expanded their horizons to protect nonelite architecture (Mason 2006); and urban designers outlined recipes for successful city development (Jacobs 1993; Garvin 2002).

In the past few years, the Brookings Institution's Metropolitan Policy Program has undertaken a research agenda aimed at illuminating spatial distinctions among city and regional populations that is stimulating a generation of new urban theories. Essays on the deconcentration of poverty, the emergence of new gateway cities for immigration, and the rise of downtown living are examples (Jargowsky 2003; Singer 2004; Birch 2005).

Social and Economic Heterogeneity Is Important A critical mid-1970 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, *Hills v. Gautreaux* (425 U.S. 284 [1976]), added a new dimension to place-based urban theory. In *Gautreaux*, the Court held that the concentration of poor minority populations in public housing was unconstitutional. The underlying assumption of the case was that economic (and by implication, social) heterogeneity was desirable.[8]

The *Gautreaux* remedies stimulated programs whose outcomes further strengthened the belief in economic heterogeneity (Popkin et al. 2000). For example, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), along with the city of Chicago (site of the *Gautreaux* case), devised a two-pronged program: (1) construction of scattered-site housing, and (2) creation of portable (beyond city boundaries) housing vouchers, both to be implemented in neighborhoods of low poverty, defined as 10 percent of the population living below the poverty level at the time of the 1990 census. Deemed successful by evaluation teams, the voucher program would inspire a $70 million national demonstration project, Moving to Opportunity, which was

8. Other important cases of the times were the Mt. Laurel I case—*Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel* (67 NY 151[1975])—which established that New Jersey municipalities could not use zoning to exclude low- and moderate-income families, and the successful suit against Starrett Housing—*Arthur v. Starrett City Associates* (98 F.R.D. 500 [E.D.N.Y. (1983)])—that struck down the use of racial quotas in tenant selection.

first applied in 1992 in five cities—Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York—and later expanded to several others (Rosenbaum and Harris 2001; Orr et al. 2003).

An important congressionally appointed commission also furthered thinking on economic diversity. After reporting on the failure of 6 percent (86,000 units) of public housing, the National Commission on Severely Distressed Housing then called for its reconstruction as part of sustainable, income-diverse communities to benefit their surrounding neighborhoods (Government Accounting Office 2002; Millennial Housing Commission 2002). In response, Congress approved the Urban Revitalization Demonstration Project, later named HOPE VI, and appropriated $6.8 billion between 1993 and 2005 for the use of 100 cities in demolishing, rehabilitating, and reconfiguring public housing projects along New Urbanist lines (Popkin et al. 2004; Madigan 2003).

As legal and congressional support for economically diverse communities gained ground, gentrification theories proliferated. Some theories continued the long-standing debates about its causes and negative effects (Ley 1996; Smith 1996; Wyly and Hammel 1999, 2004).[9] Others highlighted the new benefits of gentrification, including building local assets, reducing the concentration of poverty, and improving public services (Vigdor 2002; Freeman and Branconi 2004; Freeman 2006). Still others simply assumed that property values would increase in poor neighborhoods and developed theories about managing change. They posited that community cohesiveness, organization, and an articulated strategy to minimize the negative effects of gentrification were critical (Kennedy and Leonard 2001; Neighbor Works America 2005).[10]

Locals Know Best Local determination of municipal affairs is a long-held American value based on political theory dating from the country's earliest days. Its manifestation in urban revitalization dates from early twentieth-century voluntary campaigns to eradicate slums and beautify cities and flows through to twenty-first-century mandates for citizen participation in federal, state, and local projects. Over time, theorists have struggled with balancing power relationships associated with intergovernmental resource allocation and developing meaningful public input in local decision making (Arnstein 1969). A brief review of national housing and antipoverty legislation illustrates this tension. From the 1950s to the 1970s, as local municipalities identified urban improvement projects eligible for federal funding, successive laws called for greater public involvement and consultation. The Housing Act of 1949 required public hearings; the Housing Act of 1954 mandated citizen advisory boards; and the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act obligated localities to guarantee "maximum citizen participation" (Roberts 2004).

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9. The debate revolved around questions of whether gentrification was a result of "production-side" dynamics (capital seeking investment) or "consumption-side" dynamics (when changes in economic and demographic conditions create new demand).

10. Sources of increases in property values in poor neighborhoods include successful community development corporation activities that improve housing and amenities and purchases by new, wealthier residents.

In 1974, however, the Housing and Community Development Act, with its proviso for "adequate opportunity for citizen participation," moderated citizen input and declared local governments in control of projects. By the 1980s, federal funding reductions had left locals responsible for choosing and financing their own revitalization. Despite these changes, from the 1970s onward the public expected to be involved directly in basic issues in the urban arena through public hearings, consultation, and other means of soliciting its opinions (Roberts 2004; Faga 2006).

In meeting these expectations, cities employed newly developed communications, organizational, and planning theories, frequently involving technology and media to enhance civic engagement and thereby allowing larger numbers of people to make meaningful (or more empowering) contributions (Alinsky 1946; Davidoff 1965; Healey 1997). Examples of new forms of citizen participation are mass meetings enabled by real-time, computer-based, opinion-gathering methods such as the "Listening to the City" exercise conducted in conjunction with the decision making for the reconstruction of the World Trade Center site in New York City (Lukensmeyer and Brigham 2005) and grassroots movements such as those sponsored by the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), whose attention-grabbing operations including its recent pay-by-pennies campaign to protest high utility bills in low-income neighborhoods in Gary, Indiana, that attracted national media coverage (Eckholm 2006).

Another example of the power of local knowledge driving urban revitalization decisions lies in judicial decisions related to the use of police power and eminent domain for economic development. The 1926 U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company* (272 U.S. 365 [1926]) and subsequent judicial interpretations confirmed the local regulation of land uses through zoning (Juergensmeyer and Roberts 2003). Eminent domain has a long judicial history, but its impact on urban revitalization dates only from the 1950s. In 1954 *Berman v. Parker* (348 U.S. 26 [1954]) broke new ground in allowing the condemnation of blighted land under locally determined urban renewal programs. In 2005 the Supreme Court, in a narrow decision, *Kelo v. New London* (545 U.S. 469 [2005]), extended the use of condemnation to economic development without requiring a "blighted" designation on the targeted property. A critical dissent cited the Court's deference to local legislatures and courts in the matter, keeping the choice at the local level. Later, the states took on the issue with varying results. For example, in the spring of 2006 voters in an Orange County, California, referendum and the Ohio Supreme Court (*Norwood v. Horney* [Ohio St. 3d, 2006-Ohio-3799]) disallowed the use of condemnation of blighted land, while the governors of Arizona, New Mexico, and Iowa vetoed legislation prohibiting it.

The Private Market Is Crucial Postwar urban economic theory, with its attention to employment, housing, and retail, advocated either jump-starting or giving incentives to the private market to stimulate revitalization activities. This thinking called for three approaches: (1) attracting new firms to strengthen the municipal economic base to provide dollars for service jobs and taxes and thus retain residents (Tiebout 1956, 1963); (2) lowering barriers to entry and providing comparable public services and amenities to make urban housing competitive with its suburban counterparts (Varady and Raffel 1995; Garvin 2002); and (3) making deals, maximizing the potential of local demand, and creating public/private partnerships to enhance retail, other businesses, and housing (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989; Porter 1995; Sagalyn 2001; Roberts 2005).

A special breed of real estate developers emerged to test this theoretical work. Working with local government, they tailored products for urban markets. For example, they transformed stand-alone office buildings into mixed-use complexes that included large retail components (New York City's World Trade Center, Philadelphia's Liberty Place, and Minneapolis's IDS Center) and later housing and hospitality (New York City's Time-Warner Building). They also turned single-income housing developments into mixed-income neighborhoods that incorporated schools, community centers, and open space (Crawford Square in Pittsburgh or HOPE VI projects). And they invented festival market places (Faneuil Hall in Boston), built downtown malls, or redeveloped key streets to combine entertainment/culture and retail functions (Horton Plaza in San Diego and New York City's Times Square and 42nd Street).

Breaking down barriers to entry and attracting capital to lagging inner-city markets became the impetus for the rise of intermediary organizations in the 1970s. The Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation (founded in 1978), the Local Initiative Support Corporation (LISC, founded in 1979), and the Enterprise Foundation (founded in 1981) supported expansion of the number of community development corporations (CDCs) and community development financial institutions (CDFIs). By 1993, 11 large intermediaries were using combined assets of more than $420 million for urban revitalization (Liou and Stroh 1998, 582).

In addition, community banks such as Chicago's South Shore Bank, stand-alone entities such as Philadelphia's The Reinvestment Fund (TRF) and New York City's Community Preservation Corporation, and bank-sponsored community development departments such as the JP Morgan/Chase Community Development Corporation channeled funds into low-income areas, primarily through local CDCs. Finally, community foundations such as Baltimore's Annie Casey Foundation invested heavily in CDCs. These groups worked closely with Fannie Mae (the Federal National Mortgage Association established by congressional charter in 1938) and its related entities to add liquidity through secondary market activities to the low- and moderate-income housing markets.

Community development corporations, as private, nonprofit firms, fit nicely into the evolving urban theories, because they conformed not only to the locals-know-best thrust, but also to the economic theories of enhancing the private market (Peirce and Steinbach 1990). Originating in the 1960s, most were relatively small-scale operations (Vidal 1992; Stoeker 1997). Often assisted by indigenous foundations, a select number became beneficiaries of a foundation-led targeting of resources in the 1991 Living Cities initiative, designed to allocate $500 million in 23 cities to achieve economies of scale.

Cities Rock Contrasting popular attitudes toward the city emerged in the post–World War II period. They ranged from the positive—cities are the locus of community (Jacobs 1961) to the negative—cities are obsolete, dysfunctional, and ungovernable (Raskin 1969; Yates 1977). In the 1970s, changing communications and transportation technology resulted in increasing support for the latter view, whose advocates held that the traditional city functions as manufacturing centers, markets, transfer points, defense, and the locus of "stimuli of varied human contacts" were no longer viable. Fiscal crises in many cities, including New York, Cleveland, and Philadelphia, in the 1970s and 1980s, along with the oft-quoted *New York Daily News* headline "Ford to City: Drop Dead," appeared to confirm this diagnosis (Fuchs 1992, 1).

Within two decades, however, many observers, led by urban economists, revised their assessments, reasserting cities' continuing economic importance for their "input-sharing" (complementary businesses), "labor market-pooling" (transferable labor), and "knowledge spillovers" (exchange of ideas) functions (Strange 2006). Unique to cities was their ability to sustain the face-to-face encounters essential to the functioning and growth of the knowledge economy (Whyte 1980; Glaeser 1998).

A similar change occurred in the contemporary review of urban governance. Political scientists who had heralded cities as ungovernable in the 1970s reversed their diagnosis in the 1980s and 1990s. Capable, assertive mayors such as Cleveland's George Voinovich, New York's Ed Koch and Rudy Giuliani, Philadelphia's Ed Rendell, and Chicago's Richard Daley confronted and conquered seemingly intractable urban problems, including fiscal crises, public safety, and sanitation (Yates 1977; Bissinger 1998; Kirtzman 2000). Most notable was mayoral leadership in crime fighting, blending community policing and zero-tolerance law enforcement—that is, paying attention to both minor offenses and major crimes, as prescribed by the Broken Windows theory (Kelling and Wilson 1982).[11] When 62 percent of the 13 cities for which crime data were collected between 1970 and 2000 experienced dramatic crime reduction and substantial population growth, these theories gained credence (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972, U.S. Census Bureau 2005).[12] Visually, cities became more attractive places as creative designers (and their patrons) and city leaders fashioned architecturally exciting office buildings, parks, and cultural facilities, and as city managers paid more attention to public sanitation, including street cleaning and antigraffiti campaigns. The rise of business improvement districts—a type of special district with self-taxing powers authorized to supplement city services, devise marketing programs, and promote investment in their areas—played an important role here.

Finally, the media bore considerable responsibility for fostering the public's negative views of cities, often painting them as life-threatening infernos (Macek 2006). However, when television executives traded *Columbo* for *Sex and the City* and *Seinfeld*, they showed cities as places of excitement and possibility, marking a widespread attitudinal shift.

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11. New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles had reduced levels of total crime, and six other cities had reduced auto thefts (U.S. Census Bureau 2005).

12. But a drop in crime did not guarantee growth, and of the 38 percent with higher crime rates the record is mixed. Those cities in the Northeast and Midwest lost population, while those in the South and West gained population (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1972; U.S. Census Bureau 2005).

SHIFTING ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND LEGISLATIVE CLIMATE

The theories and attitudes just described evolved in an environment characterized by shifts in cities' economies and demographic compositions and in federal and state legislative requirements. In general, cities have jobs, which usually are quite specialized and often tied to their central locations. They also have unique population characteristics, including high numbers of small households, high racial and ethnic diversity, and high percentages of immigrants and of concentrated poverty. Furthermore, the areas affected by federal and state mandates related to development evolving since the 1970s tended to be in cities.

Economic Character American cities are important employment centers that support disproportionate numbers of jobs. For example, in 2002 the 100 most populous cities accounted for some 20 percent (about 30 million) of the nation's jobs, and the top 25 cities, with just over 18 million jobs, had 13 percent of the total (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). These levels of employment exist despite the well-documented shifts in sectoral employment (from manufacturing to service), the redistribution of population (from Frostbelt to Sunbelt, city to suburb), and the other factors surfacing between 1970 and 2000 that have drawn jobs away from traditional centers (Sternlieb and Hughes 1978).

However, during this period the character of urban employment changed in two ways. First, many large cities saw their dominant employers shift to anchor institutions. For example, in the nation's 20 largest cities a university or medical center is among the largest private employers (Rodin 2005, 237). They, along with cultural facilities, such as museums and performing arts venues, large commercial landlords, churches, and public housing authorities, all of whom tie their identities and economic fates to their locations, have become strong advocates and actors in urban revitalization. Some cities have seen a return or relocation of large corporate executive offices in their downtowns, countering the out-migration documented in the 1970s (Krugman 2006; McGeehan 2006). By 2006 *Money Magazine,* in reporting the *Fortune 500,* the annual assessment of the country's most prominent companies, reported that 20 percent of the U.S. largest corporations were headquartered in the nation's top 25 cities (*Money Magazine* 2006).

Demographic Features Shrinking average household size, greater racial and ethnic diversity, growth of immigrant populations, and the incidence of concentrated poverty distinguish today's cities from those of the 1970s.

Within three decades, the changing household composition led to a decline in the national median household size from 3.14 persons in 1970 to 2.59 persons in 2000. This phenomenon is especially evident in cities. In contrast to 1970 when the nation's families constituted 81 percent of households and married couples with children made up 40 percent, in 2000 families were only 67 percent of the total and married couples with children made up 22 percent. Cities, with their higher percentages of nonfamily and childless households than the nation in 1970, continued this trend in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2005). For example, in 2000 in the nation's three most populous cities—New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago—families were 61 percent and married couples with children were 19 percent of all households—down from 71 percent and 28 percent, respectively, in 1970 (Birch 2005).

Paralleling household changes are shifts in racial and ethnic composition, again largely experienced in cities. The 2000 census reported that 48 of the nation's hundred largest cities had majority-minority populations (Berube 2003, 139). Although differential migration and birthrate patterns contributed to this phenomenon, these cities are located throughout the United States and include Anaheim, Milwaukee, Rochester, and Fort Worth.[13]

After passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Services Act in 1965, a law that eased quotas, immigration contributed population sufficient to either increase or stabilize the number of city residents in several places. Newcomers settled in traditional as well as new gateway cities (Singer 2004). In 2000, 27 percent (or more than 8 million) of the total immigrant population lived in the nation's 25 most populous cities. The majority of today's immigrants are primarily from Central and South America, the Caribbean, and Asia, and they have contributed to the changing racial and ethnic composition of U.S. cities.

Between 1970 and 2000, cities first witnessed increases, and later decreases, in concentrated poverty. Although the population of high-poverty neighborhoods in central cities declined 21 percent over the past 10 years (from 7.6 million to 6 million), it is still higher than in 1970 (Jargowsky 2003; Jargowsky and Sawhill 2006).

The Legislative and Interest Group Climate Since 1970, federal legislation in four areas—environment, historic preservation, housing, and transportation—has affected many urban revitalization efforts.[14] The Clean Water Act of 1972, the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, and the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 addressed blighted abandoned or underutilized industrial districts (often on waterfronts) and polluted water bodies, stimulating cleanups. Even though large cities such as Detroit, Milwaukee, Memphis, Chicago, Washington, DC, Chicago, and New York have benefited from this legislation, brownfield lands remain significant barriers to redevelopment in many places.

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13. In 2000 the U.S. Census Bureau changed its reporting rules, allowing for multiracial respondents to indicate more than one race.

14. This review of legislation focuses only on four critical areas because of space limitations. However, many other federal laws have affected urban revitalization such as the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, which were important for environmental matters. The first created clean air standards and stimulated transportation and land use planning and the establishment of metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) to implement improvements. The second established a review system for large-scale federal investments intended to inform decision makers of their environmental impacts. Moreover, many states passed additional environmental review requirements for other large-scale investments at the state and local levels. This legislation would have significant but less direct effects on urban revitalization than the other acts just described. Congressional action in education and crime prevention also affected city life. For example, in response to the 1967 presidential commission that produced the report *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*, Congress initiated legislation to assist local law enforcement authorities—legislation that would be renewed or amended even to the present day. Examples of such legislation are the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Crime Control Act of 1990, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of !994, and a host of acts passed after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Passage of the National Historic Preservation Act in 1966, which created the National Register of Historic Places, of federal historic tax credit legislation in 1976, and of local laws for historic landmark and district designation facilitated preservation activities in cities. In addition, the National Trust for Historic Preservation (chartered in 1949) through its Main Street program and the National Trust Community Investment Corporation have leveraged funds to support preservation and rehabilitation (R. Moe, president, National Trust for Historic Preservation, personal communication, June 27, 2006).

In housing, changes in national legislation not only devolved postwar construction programs from the federal level to the local level, but also transformed housing finance for affordable ownership and rental housing. Under the 1974 Housing and Urban Development Act, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (created in 1965) administered the community development block grants (CDBGs), as well as the advance use of CDBG funds through Section 108 provisions, and the housing voucher programs. It retained programs for public housing replacement and the construction of specialized housing for the elderly (Section 202), disabled (Section 811), Native Americans (Section 184), and people with AIDS (Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS, or HOPWA).

Meanwhile, a more significant change was taking place in the private market in response to a combination of civil rights efforts and the refashioning of the nation's secondary mortgage market providers—Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association), Freddie Mac (Federal Home Mortgage Corporation), and Ginnie Mae (Government National Mortgage Association). In the 1960s and 1970s, Congress passed three critically important acts that reshaped local banking practices, with the result that more private capital began to look for investment opportunities in formerly neglected neighborhoods (Apgar and Duda 2003; Avery and Canner 2005). The 1968 Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act), which passed Congress six days after the assassination of civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. and was amended in 1988, outlawed discrimination in the sales and rental markets. The 1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (amended in 1989 and 1991) required banks to disclose their mortgage application and approval data. Finally, the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (amended through the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act) monitored the lending of depository institutions in their branch neighborhoods.

In tandem with these laws, regulatory and tax policy reforms unleashed new sources of capital for affordable housing. The chartering of Fannie Mae (1968) and later Freddie Mac (1970) as semiprivate, government-supervised enterprises under HUD regulation enhanced their abilities to raise capital by issuing stock and bonds and from fees from their mortgage portfolio management and mortgage-backed securities activities. Congressional authorization to purchase conventional loans covering two- to four-family units, in addition to the Federal Housing Administration– and Veterans Administration–insured single-family mortgages and the 1992 establishment of affordable housing goals (Argenti and Haley 2003), sparked formidable changes in Fannie Mae operations. By 1982 it was funding one of every seven home mortgages. To put the Fannie Mae's over $3 trillion expenditures into context, in 2001 the outstanding U.S. mortgage debt was $6.2 trillion (Argenti and Haley 2003, 5).

An important source of new capital for affordable rental housing was the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program created by Congress in the 1986 Tax Reform Act. It provided a means to gain equity for new construction and rehabilitation through the federal government's allocation of 10-year tax credits to state housing agencies, which used their own criteria to distribute them locally. By 2006 the program, which provided about half a billion dollars in tax credits annually, had produced 1.9 million affordable rental units.[15] In 2000, building on the success of the LIHTC, Congress authorized its twin, the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) program, in the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act to stimulate economic development in low-income communities. By 2006, the NMTC had allocated $8 billion in tax credits to support small businesses, cultural facilities, manufacturing, commercial property, charter schools, and other activities (CDFI Fund 2006).

Two other efforts that influenced capital flows to disadvantaged areas were the Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Communities (EZ/EC) program and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program. The EZ/EC program, which began in 1993, designated 152 sites, the majority urban, to receive favorable tax treatment and block grants to stimulate economic development. In 2000, Congress passed the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act, which authorized 49 more EZ/EC designations. The EZ/EC benefits include wage credits to employers hiring EZ residents, favorable capital gains treatment and depreciation, and brownfields cleanup deductions, bond financing, and additional LIHTCs and NMTCs (HUD 2002). The EITC, passed in 1975, offers tax relief to low-income families. In 2003 it provided 19.3 million families with $34.4 million of tax relief (Holt 2006).

Postwar transportation legislation dramatically shaped cities and their surroundings. Framed by the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act, the $425 billion program that built the nation's 47,000-mile interstate highway system, and the 2005 Safety, Accountability, Fairness, Efficiency Transportation Equity Act–Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU), four major laws were passed.[16] These laws favored highways that often plowed through city neighborhoods and waterfronts, and reached into rural areas soon converted to suburbs. Although the 1956 legislation disallowed investment in nonhighway projects, later acts had provisions for mass transit and light rail. In addition, states and localities funded mass transit. Between 1970 and 1999, mass transit annual expenditures (in 2002 dollars) increased from $6.1 billion to $30 billion (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003, 185). By 2006, 37 large cities either had embarked on or were planning light rail projects (American Public Transportation Association 2006).

Finally, state and local governments crafted new housing, economic, and community development programs. They invented finance and taxing techniques, including

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15. During its lifespan, 1937–1973, the nation's public housing program yielded about 1.1 million units. Since 1974, HUD has issued about 2.1 million housing vouchers.

16. For this law, Congress added $286 billion to the $473 billion from the two previous acts—ISTEA (Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act), passed in 1991, and TEA-21 (Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century), passed in 2001—for a total of $759 billion authorized between 1991 and 2005.

Figure 12.3
Twin Phenomena "Theory" and "Change" Framing U.S. Urban Revitalization Strategies, 1970 to Present



tax increment funding (TIF), tax-exempt municipal bonds, and targeted tax abatement and exemption. Also, starting in the 1980s they permitted business improvement districts that now number more than 1,200 nationwide (Houstoun 2003).

IMPLICATIONS FOR URBAN REVITALIZATION

As figure 12.3 illustrates, theory and change elements have fed urban revitalization during the past three decades. These phenomena have not only shaped city choices about what urban revitalization strategies to pursue, but also served as focal points for cities' reactions as they have redefined their respective roles in the American landscape.

The eight factors contained within the two phenomena (left-hand side of figure 12.3) evolved into a set of beliefs that informed and continues to inform urban revitalization approaches. First, cities are important places, because they have resources and qualities that merit attention. Second, minimizing cities' negative features, such as the concentration of poverty, and maximizing their positive attributes, such as historic architecture or strong ethnic communities, are essential. Third, being supportive and responsive to local participants is crucial. Fourth, galvanizing the economic power of the private market and applying it equitably are imperative. Depending on their age, economic vigor, local political strength, and public and private leadership, cities have chosen different urban revitalization strategies that build on this value system.

Hopeful Signs: A Typology of Urban Revitalization

Thirty years of experience with urban revitalization has yielded varying strategies. These strategies fall into four distinct categories: catalytic, downtown, neighborhood, and project-focused.

CATALYTIC

Catalytic urban revitalization encompasses bold moves that affect large amounts of land or coordinated, large-scale projects, engage public leaders at local and state levels, and often involve significant economic and political resources drawn from the public and private sectors (Katz 2006). It affects land development and land values in significant ways.

Catalytic urban revitalization includes nonconstruction and construction efforts. Nonconstruction urban revitalization approaches generally add more land or development area to a city or make their properties more desirable. Catalytic construction-based urban revitalization programs physically transform an area, are highly visible, demand sophisticated financing, and employ large public incentives and private investment. They may have innovative design elements.

Nonconstruction Efforts Examples of nonconstruction catalytic urban revitalization include annexation, consolidation, citywide zoning code rewrites, and major changes in the delivery of education and crime prevention services.

Annexation has been one of the most important tools of urban revitalization in the past decades. Although annexation alone does not guarantee increases in population and land value, it gives cities with strong economies or other attractions an opportunity for these outcomes (Rusk 1999, 2003). This technique predates the period under discussion, because cities in the Northeast and Midwest employed it in the nineteenth century. However, since 1970 cities in the West and South have actively annexed territory. For example, the movement of 48 percent of cities into and within the top 25 most populous ranks was accompanied by the addition of land area and subsequently more development and population. Notable examples are Austin (land area up 249 percent, population up 161 percent), Charlotte (land 219 percent, population 124 percent), El Paso (land 111 percent, population 75 percent), Phoenix (land 92 percent, population 127 percent), and San Antonio (land 122 percent, population 75 percent)—see figure 12.4.

City-county consolidation, another powerful technique, also predates the 30-year period under discussion. Prior to 1970, several of the nation's 25 most populous cities consolidated with their counties (for example, Philadelphia, Denver, and San Francisco) or arranged partial consolidation (for example, Indianapolis and Jacksonville). New York City, which encompassed five coterminous counties, consolidated in the late nineteenth century. In 2003 Louisville, Kentucky, consolidated its city and county governments, resulting in a dramatic increase in its area (from 60 square miles to 386 square miles) and population (from 256,000 to 694,000). The act gave the new entity important flexibility in addressing troublesome urban issues. One example is its public housing. The particularities of the public housing authorities in the county (an abundance of Section 8 housing certificates) and the city (Moving to Work designation, 4,500 public housing units, plus successful experience with one completed HOPE VI project, Park du Valle, and an allocation for a new one, Clarksdale, located near a downtown medical complex), blended to provide important revitalization opportunities (Pooley 2006).

Many cities have modified their zoning to enhance urban development and revitalization. Again, modifying zoning does not guarantee increases in population and land values, but cities have attempted to make more land available for

Figure 12.4
Land Areas of Philadelphia, Baltimore, Austin, and Phoenix: 1970 and 2000



Sources: U.S. Census Bureau (1970, 2000). Cartographer: Benjamin Cromie.

development through such changes. The changes have included dealing with unneeded industrial land, allowing for increased densities in selected residential and commercial areas, permitting mixed-use zones, specifying special zoning around natural resources such as waterfronts or environmentally fragile places, addressing transit-oriented development, defining and protecting special districts, and simplifying routine permissions while adding more scrutiny to complicated transactions. In the 1990s, 19 of the 50 largest cities reported undertaking comprehensive zoning changes, most taking a decade or more to complete. Among them were Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Denver, Detroit, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New York, Pittsburgh, San Jose, San Diego, Seattle, and Tucson (Skosey and Sellis 1999; Gleason 2003; Building Industry Association of Philadelphia 2004; City Council of Chicago 2004; Skosey 2004).

In the belief that poorly functioning municipal services contributed to depopulation, low bond ratings, abysmal city reputations, a dysfunctional labor force, and other ills, cities began to undertake in the late 1980s major reforms, especially in education and policing. Several large school systems had ongoing K–12 reform agendas over the years, but after 2000 Chicago (460,000 students), Los Angeles (727,000 students), New York City (1 million students), Philadelphia (200,000 students), and San Diego (133,000 students) renewed these efforts. (In addition, New York took dramatic steps to reestablish high standards in its 250,000-student City University system.) Finally, led by New York, cities had successfully employed community policing and later zero-tolerance law enforcement with the associated Compstat (GIS crime mapping) accountability process as new crime-fighting methods (Bratton and Kelling 2006; Smith and Bratton 2001).

Construction-Based Efforts There are at least four types of catalytic construction-based urban revitalization: (1) major infrastructure investment linked to mass transit or highways; (2) improvements in the public realm; (3) large-scale conversion of former industrial land to mixed-use areas; and (4) linkage programs harnessing development for citywide improvements. Examples from the 1970s are the construction of Washington, DC's Metro, Atlanta's MARTA, and San Francisco's BART systems. The Washington project had the most significant results in transforming the city and region (Marshall 2004; Schrag 2006).[17]

Removing or depressing freeways also has had transformative effects. Several cities have undertaken such projects, including San Francisco (Embarcadero), Milwaukee (Park East Freeway), and Portland (Harbor Drive), but Boston's "Big Dig," begun in 1991, is the most dramatic example. Although it is too soon to judge the complete effects of this strategy, to date the $15 billion project has not only contributed transportation efficiencies, but also added 300 acres of open space and 16–21 million square feet of private development opportunities in the land-constrained city (Economic Development Research Group 2006).

Cities also have undertaken public realm improvements along their waterfronts and brownfield sites. Notable examples are Baltimore (Inner Harbor), Chattanooga (Tennessee Riverpark), Chicago (Chicago River Corridor Plan and Calumet restoration), Denver (Platte River Greenway), New York City (Hudson River Park), Portland (River Place), Seattle (Central Waterfront), and Providence (Providence River Relocation) (Otto, McCormick, and Leccese 2004). Future projects that have gained public approval and financial support are Atlanta's Beltline Emerald Necklace, Chattanooga's 21st Century Waterfront Plan, and Washington, DC's Anacostia Waterfront Initiative.

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17. Chicago and New York also infused substantial capital into their mass transit systems. Although the investments did not result in the kind of new development as seen in the District of Columbia, they bolstered both cities' central business districts. In terms of annual passenger trips, the DC system, at 250 million, is far larger than San Francisco's at 95 million and Atlanta's at 69 million and comparable to New York's at 1.8 billion and Chicago's at 150 million (Puentes 2004).

Studies of the economic value of open space and thus its usefulness as an urban revitalization strategy have emerged in recent years (City Parks Forum 2002; Crompton 2005; Wachter 2005). They measure the relationships between open space improvements and investigate how increased levels of development, may affect population growth, property values, and tax assessments. Although their results are varied, they uniformly present positive conclusions. For example, a recent assessment of the economic impact of Chicago's Millennium Park anticipates $1.4 billion in residential development and at least $1.9 billion in entertainment and shopping revenues (City of Chicago 2005).

Large-scale neighborhood development in former industrial land has been a mainstay of catalytic urban revitalization. Although many cities have pursued this strategy, including Memphis (Mud Island) and Pittsburgh (Herr Island), New York City's Battery Park City (BPC) is slightly different from its counterparts because of its linkage to affordable housing. BPC is not only an important new neighborhood—indeed, one that stimulated a surge in downtown housing in Lower Manhattan—but also, through a city-state contractual arrangement, it is a project that contributes payments-in-lieu-of taxes (PILOTs), a funding stream pegged to its income and dedicated to low-cost housing production. This program helped finance massive renewal of the housing stock throughout the city's poor neighborhoods (Schill et al. 2002).

DOWNTOWN

Recent downtown revitalization builds on a long-standing tradition of strengthening centrally located business districts, but it recognizes that the era of office use domination is over (Fogelson 2001; Isenberg 2004). This strategy considers the downtown area as a "super" neighborhood that requires special attention to adapt to contemporary change. It supports offices; adds residential use (and associated services and amenities); recruits higher education, health, arts and culture (museums, performing arts facilities), hospitality (convention centers, hotels), and entertainment (restaurants, aquariums, casinos); provides major open space amenities (waterfronts, large parks with people-drawing facilities); and improves circulation (light rail, transportation hubs, pedestrian systems). The result is today's "new downtown" (Birch 2006).[18]

Three types of downtown redevelopment are currently in play: office-focused, mixed-use (24/7 environment), and town center or "faux" downtown. Office-focused redevelopment endeavors add or retain corporate office space and uses through zoning changes, special permits, tax incentives, tax increment financing, municipal provision of supplementary amenities (often parking), and site acquisition or write-down assistance. This approach, which originated in the postwar urban renewal programs, continues in varying forms today. Many cities support only commercial buildings, while others also include large, mixed-use office buildings. Examples are Lower Manhattan's Goldman Sachs (1.9 million square feet), Philadelphia's Comcast Center (1.2 million square feet), and Boston's Ritz Carlton Towers (1.8 million square feet).

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18. In the transformation of their downtowns, cities confront major conflicts among these uses and especially the issue of how to accommodate parking.

In the late 1980s, faced with chronically high vacancy rates among their older offices and lofts, cities began to redefine their downtowns as mixed-use, 24/7 environments, adding residential and other functions. The strategy calls for promoting six types of residential use (office-to-housing conversions, new construction–mixed use, new construction–single use, HOPE VI and/or LIHTC projects, historic districts, and building on "found land"); creating special districts for art, culture, science/health, and education; and improving transportation, open space, and other amenities. A widespread effort, this strategy is most advanced in cities on the East and West Coasts and in Chicago (Birch 2005).

Crafting town centers or "faux downtowns" in rapidly growing suburbs that have become cities is another downtown revitalization strategy. This approach shapes town centers with retail, entertainment, and open space, often employing new urbanist design elements such as short blocks, gridded streets, and on-street parking. The town center movement emerged in the 1980s with the construction of four model projects—Miami Lakes Town Center, Mizner Park in Florida, Mashpee Commons in Massachusetts, and Reston Town Center in Virginia— as build-outs of master planned communities or retrofitted shopping centers (Bohl 2003). Later versions—such as Easton Town Center in Columbus, Ohio; Southlake Town Square, 25 miles north of Dallas; and Legacy Town Center in Plano, Texas—incorporated housing, more expansive entertainment, and hotels and office space, usually under single ownership similar to shopping malls (EPA 2006; Herrick 2006). These town centers become regional attractions, and their managers program them with seasonal festivities and other events to animate their civic spaces. Frequently missing in these downtowns, however, are public transportation, churches, libraries, schools, cultural facilities, and residential-serving retail (grocery and hardware stores).

NEIGHBORHOOD

The central goal of neighborhood revitalization is to restore land values and smooth market operations in depreciated areas. This strategy covers a large variety of initiatives, but usually focuses on improving deteriorated residential districts and associated commercial corridors and assisting low-income households (Brophy and Burnett 2003). Although these kinds of programs date from the late nineteenth century, today's efforts aim to reduce concentrated poverty by attracting or growing middle-income households. In doing so, they undertake neighborhood-based physical and social improvements such as upgrading housing stock, improving streetscapes and public space, cleaning up brownfield lands, greening vacant lots, energizing retail corridors, and providing better schools and neighborhood centers that offer programs involving job training, small business assistance, health service delivery, consumer education, and daycare. Citywide school reform efforts benefit neighborhoods, and, recently, facilitating transportation links to jobs in the surrounding region has emerged as an essential function of neighborhood redevelopment (Fox and Treuhaft 2006).

Neighborhood revitalization programs have approaches ranging from comprehensive to quasi-focused approaches to very targeted ones. The comprehensive approach assesses and addresses all neighborhoods according to need. Minneapolis's Neighborhood Revitalization Program, created in 1987, and Philadelphia's Neighborhood Transformation Initiative, created in 2001, are two examples.

Quasi-focused efforts cover low- and moderate-income neighborhoods such as in Cambridge, Massachusetts; Raleigh, North Carolina; and Albany, New York. Targeted methods concentrate public and private resources on a limited number of neighborhoods as exemplified by Richmond's Neighborhoods in Bloom program. How cities choose their strategy varies from place to place. Some may do so stimulated by the federal reporting requirements associated with the community development block grant program. Others may have strong political motivations, often locating their neighborhood improvement operations directly within the mayor's office.[19]

Neighborhood revitalization involves complicated regulatory, financing, and land acquisition issues that bring public and private sector groups together. The shifting economic, demographic, and legislative climate described earlier in this chapter is the context in which these programs act. The public and private sectors, along with nonprofit organizations such as community development corporations and anchor institutions, typically drive neighborhood revitalization programs and influence them, according to their goals.

In programs led by the public sector, local or state governments plan and implement a given project. Although this mode once dominated neighborhood revitalization and is exemplified by public housing construction between 1949 and 1973, it is less common today. Now, the public sector typically forms partnerships with the nonprofits or the private sector in a variety of ways, including capital investment in infrastructure or amenities, site acquisition, financing, tax abatements, and technical assistance in planning and economic development. Some cities have concentrated their CDBG dollars on special projects. For example, since 1995, Boston has used CDBG funds to finance a multisite retail development, undertaken in conjunction with the Main Street program sponsored by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. The city has created a Main Street division in its Department of Neighborhood Development to provide staff, technical assistance, grants, and publicity for 19 commercial strips, and it now reports more than $10 million in public and private investment in the areas and the opening of more than 500 new businesses (Marcuss 2005; City of Boston 2006).

Today, the nation's community development corporations, numbering 4,600, are the leaders in neighborhood development. They are usually 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations that focus primarily on physical development, operating in every state, about a quarter of all CDCs are faith-based organizations. Taken as a group, CDCs are the single largest builders of low-income housing in the United States (Stoeker 1997; Filner 2001; Steinbach 2006). Since 1968, CDCs have produced 1.25 million housing units, experiencing a tenfold increase since 1988. This production level is about equal to the number of the nation's public housing units (NCCED 2006; Steinbach 2006, 12). They have also built 126 million square feet

19. With the inception of the community development block program, the federal government required the one thousand "entitlement" cities or places receiving CDBG funds to produce a comprehensive report, variously named the Housing Assistance Plan (HAP), Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy (CHAS), or Consolidated Plan (ConPlan). These reports needed to contain an assessment of low- and moderate-income neighborhoods and a discussion of anticipated improvements.

of industrial and commercial space and created three-quarters of a million jobs (NCCED 2006, 4). CDCs are important beneficiaries of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit and the New Markets Tax Credit programs. Despite these performance data, CDCs are relatively small operations that vary greatly by region and in scale and number. Seven years ago their annual median housing production was 21 units (Steinbach 2006), and in 2005 they averaged 18 units per CDC (NCCED 2006). Regionally, more CDCs exist in the north-central United States (29 percent of the total) and South (29 percent) than in the Northeast (22 percent) and West (20 percent). Over the past seven years, CDCs have increased their median staff size from six to ten and added scale, with the number of large CDCs (defined as those that have produced 100 units or more of housing over their lifetimes) rising from 34 percent to 44 percent of the total. During the same period, the number of CDCs increased by 27 percent. With this growth has come a 39 percent rise in annual production (from 62,000 units to 86,000 units). CDCs with large budgets ($2 million or more or administrative budgets of at least $100,000) have been the most successful (Stoeker 1997, 61; Anukwe et al. 2003; Steinbach 2006).

Among CDCs, individual capacity varies widely, and in recent times some have experienced financial and administrative difficulties, while others have flourished (Grogan and Proscio 2000; Rohe and Bratt 2003). In addition, some have had identity difficulties, struggling internally with their missions. With roots in the 1960s War on Poverty, they are torn between conflicting goals of fostering community organization and empowerment and focusing on housing production and other bottom line–type economic development activities (Stoeker 1997; Vidal and Keating 2004).

Nevertheless, the CDCs' accomplishments are significant, largely due to the support of national intermediaries, especially the Local Initiative Support Corporation (LISC) and the Enterprise Foundation, and to regional intermediaries—notably New York City's Community Preservation Corporation and Philadelphia's TRF. These intermediaries not only have access to capital—marketing tax credits, filtering foundation grants such as the Livable Cities initiatives, and other funds—but also offer technical assistance for existing work and funded innovative projects. Their aid has been in the form of equity (through LIHTCs and NMTCs), loans, and grants. Since the early 1980s, these intermediaries have collectively filtered more than $15 billion to CDCs throughout the United States. In 2005, for example, the LISC provided $938 million—70 percent in equity, 25 percent in loans, and 4 percent in grants (LISC 2006). Their new initiatives include providing working capital loans for organizational and land acquisition or land banking projects (Willis 2004).

For a few specialized private developers, the central mission is providing low-income housing; others have added it to their larger portfolios. Examples of both types of developers are McCormack Baron Associates in St. Louis, Integral Properties in Atlanta, Related Companies of California in Irvine, and Cochoran Jennison in Boston. Often, these companies are more equipped than CDCs to undertake large-scale construction, because they have experienced personnel, access to capital, and a single focus. Many of these companies have engaged in other community-building projects such as schools and daycare centers in order to strengthen their own projects or in response to federal incentives such as the NMTCs.

Anchor institutions (universities, health institutions, cultural facilities, churches, and public housing authorities) are yet another key participant in neighborhood revitalization (Perry and Wiewel 2005; Rodin 2005). As with other groups, their improvement projects take a long time and require substantial financial support and sustained leadership. Although these anchor institutions undertake most efforts for internal institutional advancement—mainly the need for more space—several, especially universities, have sponsored broad campaigns beyond their campuses designed to preserve the safety, improve the physical appearance, and upgrade the economic status of their surroundings. Among them are the University of Chicago, Ohio State, Howard, Georgia Tech, Georgia State, Yale, Columbia, University of Pennsylvania, University of Southern California, and St. Louis University. Other examples of the participation of anchor institutions in neighborhood revitalization are hospitals and public housing authorities (Zipperer 2005; Atlanta Housing Authority 2006). Hospitals often incorporate housing and social services into facilities expansion, while public housing authorities, employing the HOPE VI program, raze or partially raze obsolete housing, redesign the site, and rebuild mixed-income settlements. Researchers report positive results: less concentrated poverty; increases in adjacent property values; and higher performance (employment and educational attainment) of former public housing residents (Popkin et al. 2004; Boston 2005; Turbov and Piper 2005).

PROJECT-FOCUSED

Although the efforts just described enhance the economic bases of their cities, they are part of a larger vision that extends beyond a single project. Some places, however, focus on a single project for the sole purpose of attracting outside dollars to their economies either through direct consumer expenditures or user taxes. These projects tend to take the form of expensive, large-scale facilities, ranging from convention centers to performing arts venues to sports stadiums to research parks. They have precise site location demands related to spatial requirements, highway access, and parking. They also require massive financing packages (made up of bonds, TIF, tax abatements, and land deals, among other things). Meanwhile, they often spark considerable controversy because of their expense or location.

Although many researchers question the payback on these types of efforts, cities continue to invest in them. Over the past decade, no effort has been more contested than the construction of sports stadiums (Noll and Zimbalist 1997). These evaluations have been retrospective assessments grounded in public finance and relying on regional, not city-based, data and estimated multiplier effects. Recent studies of sports stadiums, however, are more positive than those carried out earlier. These studies gauge the effects of a stadium's physical design (relationship to the neighborhood and retail/business formation, location of parking, and architecture), measure proximate (half-mile radius), property valuations, differentiate between minor league versus major league facilities, and address nonpecuniary effects such as amenity attracting knowledge workers (Nelson 2001; Coates and Humphreys 2003).

In the midst of this debate, since 1998, 21 cities have collectively built eleven football, eight baseball, and seven basketball facilities. They ranged in cost (in 2003 dollars) from $190 million for Tampa, Florida's Raymond James football stadium, which opened in 1998, to $587 million for Seattle's Safeco (baseball) Field, which opened in 1999 (Coates and Humphreys 2003, 19).

Conclusions: Hopeful Signs Today and Tomorrow

As this survey reveals, since 1970 cities have held their own in terms of their share of the national population. Although different cities have had varied success, there are more large cities today than 30 years ago, and the average size of the top 100 cities has increased. The top 25 cities are relatively stable in terms of the cities in the group, but individual rankings have changed. One reason these conditions prevail is the active role cities have taken in addressing their growth and development or redevelopment problems.

Over time, attitudes toward cities and the context in which they exist have changed, and, in response, cities have pursued a wide range of urban revitalization strategies: catalytic, downtown, neighborhood, and project-focused. Cities employ some or all of these approaches, depending on their needs, and the results may have been reflected in population growth and household increases and in other changes affecting land values, development patterns, and market dynamics, whose examination is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Although U.S. urban revitalization is a local affair undertaken primarily at the municipal level with the state and federal governments offering direct and indirect financial support, it is the result of a complex mix of public, nonprofit, and private investments. The United States has no stated national policy about the economic health of its cities or what it considers to be an appropriate distribution of its population. Nevertheless, municipalities have undertaken an astounding number of urban revitalization activities over the past 30 years during which they and their partners have refined their approaches (see figure 12.5). Their reliance on local

Figure 12.5
Urban Revitalization Typology: Varied Approaches Taken Singly or Jointly by Cities, 1970 to Present

Catalytic
- Nonconstruction (annexation, consolidation, zoning, municipal services reform)
- Construction (major infrastructure linked to mass transit or highways, public realm or open space, citywide linkage programs)

Downtown
- Office (traditional, mixed-use)
- 24/7 residential emphasis (office/loft conversion; new construction: single-use, mixed-use, special purpose, HOPE VI, historic district)
- Town center/faux downtown

Neighborhood
- Types (comprehensive, semitargeted, targeted)
- Agents (public sector, community development corporation, private developer, anchor institution)

Project-focused
- Large-scale single project (convention center, stadium, performing arts venue)

property taxes (and to a limited extent sales and income taxes) has been a powerful incentive for these efforts. Employing techniques ranging from annexation, zoning revision, and municipal service reforms that have citywide implications to small-scale, block-level reconstruction, the nation's cities are reinventing themselves, as they strive to increase their income-producing abilities, ensure their survival, and promote their advancement beyond basic need.

Five themes frame the character of contemporary urban revitalization endeavors. Taken together, they help to explain the process by which today's hopeful signs will become tomorrow's permanent accomplishments. First, whether large or small, urban revitalization approaches leave physical marks on their cities. Second, they take a long time to conceive, implement, and yield results. They also require focused and sustained leadership from the groups that engage in them. Third, over the past two decades municipalities and their leaders have used urban revitalization to redefine their cities and neighborhoods and are crafting programs and approaches to support and sustain these changes. Fourth, of the approaches, the catalytic are expensive, but they appear to be having big payoffs in terms of city positioning; the downtown efforts are strengthening central places; the neighborhood programs are creating new communities; and the project-based efforts are adding place-defining facilities. Fifth, although urban revitalization is extraordinarily complicated in terms of assembling resources, developing sophisticated leadership, and fostering a supportive political environment, it is flourishing in its many forms.

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